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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
Debra Martinez, 
Defendant/Appellant 
Case # 990381CA 
Priority # 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
NATURE OF CASE AND JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Appellant/Defendant Debra Martinez and her co-defendant 
Archie Martinez were charged by Information with Possession 
of a Controlled Substance with Intent to Distribute, a Third 
Degree Felony (Utah Code Ann. §58-37-8(1) (a) (i)) , based upon 
evidence obtained during a highway stop of the co-
defendant's vehicle. Defendants were tried together in 
Seventh Judicial District Court and were both represented by 
the same attorney, Mr. Victor Gordon. Debra Martinez was 
found guilty of the lesser included offense of Possession of 
a Controlled Substance, also a Third Degree Felony. UTAH CODE 
-1-
ANN. §58-37-8 (2) (B) (II) . 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this 
matter pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. §78-2A-3(F) , as amended. 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS, STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
PRESENTED ON APPEAL, AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue 1. Did trial counsel's attempt to represent co-
defendants with conflicting interest deprive Appellant of 
her right to the effective assistance of counsel? 
Standard of Review. Where the issue of competence of 
counsel is raised for the first time on appeal, the claim 
presents an issue of law reviewed for correctness. State v. 
Gallegos, 957 P.2d 973 (1998); State v. Newman, 928 P.2d 
1040 (Utah 1996); State v. Saunders, 893 P.2d 584, 591 (Utah 
App. 19 ), cert, granted, 910 P.2d 425 (Utah 1995); State 
v. Smith, 621 P.2d 697, 698 (Utah 1990). 
Issue 2. Did counsel's failure to move for exclusion 
of illegally obtained evidence deprive Appellant of her 
right to the effective assistance of counsel? 
Standard of Review. Where the issue of competence of 
counsel is raised for the first time on appeal, the claim 
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presents an issue of law reviewed for correctness. State v. 
Gallegos, 957 P.2d 973 (1998); State v. Newman. 928 P.2d 
1040 (Utah 1996); State v, Saunders, 893 P.2d 584, 591 (Utah 
App. 19 ), cert, granted, 910 P.2d 425 (Utah 1995); State 
v. Smith, 621 P.2d 697, 698 (Utah 1990). 
Issue 3. Did counsel ' s waiver of Appellant's right to 
a preliminary hearing and counsel's failure to perform any 
discovery deprive defendant of her right to the effective 
assistance of counsel? 
Standard of Review, Where the issue of competence of 
counsel is raised for the first time on appeal, the claim 
presents an issue of law reviewed for correctness. State v, 
Gallegos, 957 P.2d 973 (1998); State v, Newman, 928 P.2d 
1040 (Utah 1996); State v, Saunders, 893 P.2d 584, 591 (Utah 
App. 19 ), cert, granted, 910 P.2d 425 (Utah 1995); State 
v. Smith, 621 P.2d 697, 698 (Utah 1990) . 
None of the above issues 1-3 were preserved at trial; 
however, this Court's consideration of a claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel based upon plain error is 
not barred. State v. Smith, 621 P.2d 697, 699 (Utah 1990). 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On or about December 4, 1997, Debra Martinez and her 
co-defendant were charged by Information with Possession of 
a Controlled Substance with Intent to Distribute, a Third 
Degree Felony in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. §58-37-
8(1) (A) (I) , based upon evidence obtained from their vehicle 
during a highway stop. (R00001) Mrs. Martinez and co-
defendant appeared pro se before the Seventh Judicial 
District Court on January 7, 1998, and a preliminary hearing 
was scheduled for February 18, 1998. (Minute Entry p. 2). 
On February 18, 1998, attorney Mr. Victor Gordon 
(hereinafter "Mr. Gordon") appeared with Appellant and her 
co-defendant and requested a continuance, stating that he 
had just been retained to represent them. (Minute Entry p. 
3) The preliminary hearing was rescheduled for April 22, 
1998 (Minute Entry p. 3) . 
On April 22, 1998, Mr. Gordon appeared one and one-half 
hours after the scheduled time for the preliminary hearing. 
Because the witnesses had been dismissed, the preliminary 
hearing was again reset for May 6, 1998 (Minute Entry p. 4, 
-4-
R00024) . 
On the afternoon of May 5, 1998, Mr. Gordon sent to the 
court a facsimile transmission requesting a third 
continuance due to health problems (Minute Entry p. 4, 
R00022). On May 6, 1998, the prosecuting attorney appeared 
at the time scheduled for the hearing and objected to yet 
another continuance, noting that his witness had now 
traveled from Logan, Utah, to Moab, Utah, for the third time 
(Minute Entry p. 4, R00025). 
Despite what the court characterized as "inadequate 
notice" on the part of Mr. Gordon (R00024, see fn. 1), the 
court issued an order on May 11, 1998, again rescheduling 
the preliminary hearing to July 14, 1998 (R00024-5) . 
On July 14, 1998, the rescheduled preliminary hearing 
date, Mr. Gordon appeared, unprepared to go forward,1 and 
waived the preliminary hearing altogether. (Minute Entry p. 
5, R00027) Trial was then scheduled. (Minute Entry p. 5) 
Mr. Gordon filed no discovery request, and as such, 
1
 In the Court's August 24, 1998, Order concerning sanctions for Mr. Gordon's non-
appearances, the Court stated, "Counsel has appeared before the court on four occassions and has 
not appeared on time prepared to proceed even once." (R00029) 
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never received the police report or other documents which 
would have supported the State's case. Apart from documents 
relating to rescheduling of hearings, Mr. Gordon filed no 
documents prior to trial. Id. Additionally, he made little 
or no effort to negotiate a plea bargain although co-
defendant requested that he do so. (Sentencing Tr. at p. 
12) . 
Prior to trial, Appellant's co-defendant consulted with 
Mr. Gordon and stated that he wished to plead guilty to the 
charges to save Appellant (Sentencing Tr. at p.11). He 
expressed his wish to inform the Court that he was solely at 
fault and to assist in acquitting Appellant. (Sentencing Tr. 
at p. 11-12) . However, the record shows no attempt by Mr. 
Gordon to inform the prosecution of Appellant's co-
defendant ' s request to plead as charged to save his co-
defendant from being wrongfully convicted. (R00001-2, 
Sentencing Tr. at p. ). 
At trial, Utah Highway Patrol Officer Sheldon Riches 
testified that on November 25, 1997, while patrolling 1-70 
east of Green River (Tr. at p. 49) , he observed a van 
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driving "in an unsafe manner" and activated flashers, 
causing the vehicle to stop (Tr. at p. 50-1, 69-70) . 
Appellant's co-defendant, Mr. Martinez, the driver, was 
unable to produce a license and Officer Riches proceeded to 
check on his driving history (Tr. at p. 51-2, 71-2) . 
According to Officer Riches, he was informed by Price 
Dispatch that Mr. Martinez had a suspended New Mexico 
license (Tr. at p. 53-4) and also had a record of prior 
charges involving weapons and drugs (Tr. at p. 51-2, 73, 
78). Officer Riches testified that he received no further 
information concerning the date of these prior charges. (Tr. 
at p. 72-3, 81); however, according to Mr. Martinez's 
Presentence Investigation Report, the only such charges on 
his record dated back to 1989. 
Officer Riches testified that he was concerned for his 
safety (Tr. at p. 52-4, 74) and that he asked Mr. Martinez 
for permission to search the vehicle for weapons. (Tr. at 
p. 53, 78) Mr. Martinez declined (Tr. at p. 53, Sentencing 
Tr. at p. 82, 87). At approximately this time, Emery County 
Sgt. Gayle Jensen, who was on patrol and heard the radio 
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exchange with Price Dispatch arrived to assist Officer 
Riches (Tr. at p. 53, 86-7) 
Officer Riches then approached defendant, a passenger 
and registered owner of the vehicle (Tr. at p. 53, 85, 87-
88) and requested permission to search for weapons (Tr. at 
p. 53-4, 82, 88). Defendant consented (Tr. at p. 53, 78, 
82-88, but asked Officer Riches not to awaken the baby, who 
was sleeping behind the passenger's seat (Tr. at p.52, 76). 
Officer Riches searched the area around and behind the 
driver's and passenger's seats and found no weapons, the 
purported objective of his search (Tr. at p.54, 77-9, 83, 
88). He testified that he shined his flashlight around in 
the back of the vehicle "looking for weapons" (Tr. at p. 77) 
and noticed that the child's safety belt was unsecured. (Tr. 
at p. 75-77). Again during this search with his flashlight, 
he found no weapons (Tr. at p. 54, 77-79, 83). 
Following this initial search, Officer Riches or Sgt. 
Jensen asked Appellant if the officers could search the back 
of the vehicle (Tr. at p. 54, 88). Officer Riches testified 
that he could see "a bundle, but I did not know what it was, 
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underneath the infant," (Tr. at p. 54, 88) and that "there 
was a white and red quilted blanket that was covering, which 
it was--I couldn't see it at the time, it was a rectangular 
shaped object." (Tr. at p. 55) Officer Riches never 
testified that this "bundle" appeared to be a weapon or that 
he believed it to be a weapon. 
Sgt. Jensen then asked Mrs. Martinez to lift the 
blanket and she complied. (Tr. at p. 54-55, 88-89) 
Underneath the blanket was a cubical package wrapped in 
black plastic (Tr. at p. 55, 89) Following presentation 
of the prosecution's case, Mr. Gordon made an opening 
statement in which he described anticipated testimony by Mr. 
Martinez and Appellant. (Tr., at p. 114-12 8) . Mr. Gordon then 
conferred with both defendants and announced that neither of 
them wished to testify. (Tr. at p. 128) He rested his case 
without having presented any evidence. (Tr. at p. 129). The 
Court, outside the presence of the jury, questioned Mr. 
Gordon concerning the surprise created by Mr. Martinez and 
Appellant's unexpected failure to testify and the possible 
negative inferences which the jury might draw therefrom (Tr. 
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at p. 130). Because Mr. Gordon had submitted no proposed 
jury instructions (Tr. at p. 131), the court proposed adding 
a jury instruction concerning defendants' failure to 
testify, to which Mr. Gordon agreed. (Tr. at p. 131, 141). 
The court also instructed the jury concerning the lesser 
included offense of possession of a controlled substance. 
(Tr. at p. 131-2, 138) 
Appellant was found guilty of Possession of a 
Controlled Substance, a Third Degree Felony. (Tr. at p. 158, 
R00061) A sentencing hearing was then scheduled to commence 
on December 2, 1998. (Minute Entry p. 8) Mr. Gordon failed 
to appear at that hearing. (Minute Entry p. 8) Present 
counsel was appointed and appeared at the rescheduled 
sentencing hearing on December 16, 1998 (Minute Entry p. 8). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
U.S. CONST., AMEND. VI states, "In all criminal prosecutions, 
the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the Assistance of 
counsel for his defense." UTAH CONST., ART. I, §12 states, "In 
criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear 
and defend in person and by counsel, ..." These inalienable 
-10-
rights guarantee criminal defendants the right to the effective 
assistance of counsel. 
In analyzing a claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel, the two-prong test of Strickland v. Washinton is 
applied as explained in State v. Brandley, 972 P.2d 78, 84 
(Utah 1997): 
Defendant must show, first, that his counsel 
rendered a performance which fell below an 
objective standard of reasonable professional 
judgment and, second, that counsel's deficient 
performance prejudiced the defendant, citing State 
v. Gordon, 913 P.2d 350, 355 (Utah 1996), 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 
(1984) . 
Trial counsel attempted to represent co-defendants 
with conflicting interests in a criminal matter which 
culminated in depriving Appellant of her right to the 
affective assistance of counsel. State v. Holland, 876 P. 2d 
357 (Utah 1994) sets forth the following: 
If an attorney's loyalty is compromised because ... he 
is influenced by a conflict in loyalties to other 
defendants, ... the law cannot tolerate the risk that 
the attorney will fail to subject the prosecution's 
case to the kind of adversarial challenge necessary to 
ensure that the accused receives the effective 
assistance of counsel as guaranteed by the Sixth 
Amendment. 
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Id. at 360 (quoting IT. £. v. Cronic. 466 U.S. 648, 659 
(1984)) . 
Trial Counsel failed to move for exclusion of illegally 
obtained evidence which culminated in depriving Appellant of 
her right to the effective assistance of counsel. In State 
v. Gall egos, 957 P.2d 973 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) this Court 
found that counsel's performance was ineffective where 
counsel failed to move to suppress evidence gained during an 
illegal search. 
Trial Counsel failed to do discovery or conduct a 
preliminary hearing which culminated in depriving Appellant 
of her right to the effective assistance of counsel. The 
Utah Supreme Court stated as follows in State v. Templin, 
805 P.2d 182, 187 (1990) : 
If counsel does not adequately investigate the 
underlying facts of a case, including the 
availability of prospective defense witnesses, 
counsel's performance cannot fall within the "wide 
range of reasonable professional assistance." 
This is because a decision not to investigate 
cannot be considered a tactical decision. It is 
only after an adequate inquiry has been made that 
counsel can make a reasonable decision to call or 
not to call particular witnesses for tactical 
reasons, {citations omitted 
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Based upon the foregoing, Appellant was deprived of her 
right to the effective assistance of counsel during the 
proceedings in Seventh Judicial District Court. 
ARGUMENT 
I. TRIAL COUNSEL'S ATTEMPT TO REPRESENT CO-DEFENDANTS 
WITH CONFLICTING INTERESTS DEPRIVED APPELLANT OF HER 
RIGHT TO THE AFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL. 
U.S. CONST., AMEND. VI states, "In all criminal prosecutions, 
the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the Assistance of 
counsel for his defense." UTAH CONST., ART. I, §12 states, "In 
criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear 
and defend in person and by counsel, ..." These inalienable 
rights guarantee criminal defendants the right to the assistance 
of counsel. More specifically, case law supports that this 
inalienable right has been interpreted as the right to "the 
effective assistance of counsel" McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 
749, 771 n. 14(1970) (accord State v. McNinol, 554 P.2d 203, 204 
(Utah 1976)), and it encompasses the right to representation free 
from a conflict of interest. State v. Lovell, 984 P.2d 382, 286 
(Utah 1999); State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); 
Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 (1978); U.S. v. Rurney. 756 
F.2d 787, 790 (10th Cir. 1985) . 
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A general test for determination of a claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel was articulated in Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 692, 697 (1984) (See Section below); 
however, when such a claim is based upon a conflict of interest, 
it is uniquely categorized and must be analyzed under a different 
standard. State v. Bredehoft, 966 P.2d 285, 291 (1998); State V, 
Johnson, 823 P.2d 484, 488 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (quot ing State v. 
Velarde, 806 P.2d 1190, 1192 (Utah Ct. App. 1991)). In such 
cases, prejudice may be presumed if the defendant demonstrates 
"that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his 
lawyer's performance." State v. Brandley, 972 P.2d 78, 85, 
quoting State v. Taylor, 947 P.2d 681, 686 (Utah 1997); Cuyler v. 
Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348 (1980); accord State v. Bredehoft, 
966 P.2d 285, 291 (Utah Ct. App. 1998); Gardner v. Holdenf 888 
P.2d 608, 620 (Utah 1994); State v. Webbf 790 P.2d 65, 73 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1990); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 
(1984) . Where such conflict occurs, the Court will not "indulge 
in nice calculations as to the amount of prejudice arising 
therefrom." Glasser v. U.S., 315 U.S. 60, 76 (1942), see Cuyler 
V, Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348-50 (1980); Holloway v. Arkansas, 
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435 U.S. 475, 487 (1978).2 
In State v. Holland, 876 P.2d 357 (Utah 1994), the Utah 
Supreme Court found that due to a conflict of interest, 
defendant, Mr. Holland, had been denied his right to effective 
2
 The U.S. Supreme Court in Holloway v. Arkansas. 435 U.S. 475, 487 (1978) elaborated an 
even broader rule of presumed prejudice in cases where a trial Court has been alerted to the 
possibility of such conflict, yet failed to remedy it. In such cases, only the potential for conflict 
need be shown, rather than the existence of an actual conflict, as required in the present case. 
The difference between the two standards was explained by the present Court in State v. Webb, 
790 P.2d 645, 73 (1990). The Webb Court noted that "a defendant who raises no objection at 
trial to multiple representation must show that an actual conflict of interest existed, which 
adversely affected his lawyer's performance," quoting Cuyler, supra. The Webb Court 
continued: 
A defendant who makes such a showing need not demonstrate prejudice to 
establish an ineffectiveness of counsel claim." [citations omitted.] The reason for 
presuming prejudice in conflict of interest case meeting this standard, which is 
less rigorous than the Strickland test generally applicable to ineffective counsel 
claims, was explained in Strickland, itself: 
In Cuyler, [we] held that prejudice is presumed when counsel is 
burdened by an actual conflict of interest. In those circumstances, 
counsel breached the duty of loyalty, perhaps the most basic of 
counsel's duties. Moreover, it is difficult to measure the precise 
effect on the defense of representation corrupted by conflicting 
interests. Given the obligation of counsel to avoid conflicts of 
interest and the ability of trial Courts to make an early inquiry in 
certain situations likely to give rise to conflicts ... it is reasonable 
for the criminal justice system to maintain a fairly rigid rule of 
presumed prejudice for conflicts of interest. Even so, the rule is 
not quite the per se rule of prejudice that exists for the Sixth 
Amendment claims mentioned above [i.e., actual or constructive 
denial of the assistance of counsel altogether]. Prejudice is 
presumed only if the defendant demonstrates that counsel "actively 
represented conflicting interests" and that "an actual conflict of 
interest adversely affected his lawyer's performance. 
790 P.2d at 73; accord Burger v. Kempr 483 P.2d 776 (1987). 
-15-
assistance of counsel. While representing Mr. Holland in that 
case, defense counsel called Mr. Holland to testify in behalf of 
another of counsel's clients in an unrelated case. Counsel's 
reason for having Mr. Holland testify was to demonstrate that, 
when compared to Mr. Holland, counsel's other client did not 
deserve the death penalty. Id. at 358. Counsel "wanted to 
question Holland concerning his own criminal acts and background 
so that the jury could compare Holland's background and criminal 
activities with those of [the other client]." Id. In 
disqualifying counsel from further representation of Mr. Holland, 
the court discussed the conflict of interest shown by his 
actions: 
If an attorney's loyalty is compromised because ... he 
is influenced by a conflict in loyalties to other 
defendants, ... the law cannot tolerate the risk that 
the attorney will fail to subject the prosecution's 
case to the kind of adversarial challenge necessary to 
ensure that the accused receives the effective 
assistance of counsel as guaranteed by the Sixth 
Amendment. 
Id. at 360 {quoting U.S. v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659 
(1984)) . 
The Court further emphasized the importance of the 
attorney's duty of loyalty to his client: 
Critical to the attorney-client relationship and the 
integrity of judicial proceedings is an attorney's duty 
to represent the interest of a client with zeal and 
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loyalty. The duty of loyalty is so essential to the 
proper functioning of the judicial system that its 
faithful discharge is mandated not only by the Rules of 
Professional Conduct, but also, in criminal cases, by 
the Sixth Amendment right of a criminal defendant to 
the effective assistance of counsel. 
Id. at 359 {citing U.S. v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 656-7 
(1984); Von Moltke V. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 725-6 (1948) 
(plurality opinion)). 
The Holland court continued: 
The faithful discharge of that duty is a vital factor 
both in uncovering and making clear to Court the truth 
on which a just decision depends and in protecting the 
rights of person charged with a crime. In almost all 
cases, defendants are wholly dependent on the 
dedication of their attorney to protect their interests 
and to ensure their fair treatment under the law. 
In Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 725-6 
(1948)(plurality opinion), Justice Hugo Black 
wrote the following: The right to counsel 
guaranteed by the Constitution contemplates 
the services of any attorney devoted solely 
to the interests of his client . . . Undivided 
allegiance and faithful, devoted service to a 
client are prized traditions of the American 
lawyer. It is this kind of service for which 
the Sixth Amendment make provision. 
Id. at 359. 
Having found that this "direct and fundamental" duty of 
loyalty had been breached, the Holland Court declined to inquire 
whether the breach of that duty had caused prejudice to Mr. 
Holland. The Court explained, "We are obliged not to do so by 
our own precedent . . . and that of the United States Supreme 
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Court," Id. at 361 (citing State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851, 857-8 
(Utah 1992), Glasser V. U.S., 315 U.S. 60, 75-6 (1942)).3 
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that 
"representation by one attorney of two or more defendants in 
prosecutions arising from a single criminal episode invariably 
creates the possibility that a conflict of interest will arise." 
Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980). This potential conflict 
was elaborated in Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 (1978): 
Joint representation of conflicting interests is 
suspect because of what it tends to prevent the 
attorney from doing ... Generally speaking, a conflict 
may also prevent an attorney from challenging the 
admission of evidence prejudicial to one client but 
perhaps favorable to another, or from arguing at the 
sentencing hearing the relative involvement and 
culpability of his clients in order to minimize the 
culpability of one by emphasizing that of another. 
Examples can readily be multiplied. 
But in a case of joint representation of competing 
interests the evil--it bears repeating--is in what the 
advocate finds himself compelled to refrain from doing, 
not only at trial but also as to possible pretrial plea 
3
 The Holland Court continued, "In Glasser, the Supreme Court 
reversed a conviction because an attorney represented co-
defendants with adverse interests. The Court refused to inquire 
into the issue of prejudice because 'the right to have the 
assistance of counsel is too fundamental and absolute to allow 
courts to indulge in nice calculations as to the amount of 
prejudice arising from its denial.'" Id. at 361, quoting Glasser 
at 76, see also Statp v. Smith, 621 P.2d 697, 699 (Utah 1980). 
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negotiations and in the sentencing process. 
Id. at 489-90. 
In .State v. Webbf 790 P.2d 65, 75 (1980), this Court 
recognized the danger inherent in representation of co-defendants 
by a single attorney, reiterating the rule of presumed prejudice 
discussed in Cuyler and Holloway. In Webb, where a single 
attorney had represented co-defendants accused of robbery, the 
court described its criteria for determining whether an actual 
conflict of interest had been shown: 
Appellants must make a factual showing of inconsistent 
interests and must demonstrate that the attorney 'made 
a choice between possible alternative courses of 
action.' An actual conflict of interest exists when 
the respective defenses of multiple defendants are 
inconsistent, i.d. if 'introduction of probative 
evidence or plausible arguments that would 
significantly benefit one defendant would damage the 
defense of another defendant whom the same counsel is 
representing.' 
Webb at 75 (quoting U.S. v. Mers, 701 F.2d 1321, 1328 (11th 
Cir.),cert. denied, 16 464 U.S. 991 (1983)). 
The Webb Court further noted that "a substantial disparity 
of evidence incriminating each defendant" is among the 
circumstances which may show an actual conflict of interest on 
the part of defense counsel. Id. at 76 (citing Armstrong v. 
People, 701 P.2d 17, 22 (Colo. 1985)(en banc)). 
In State v. Smith, 621 P.2d 697 (1980), the Utah Supreme 
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Court found that such a conflict of interest had been 
demonstrated. In that case, a single attorney represented at the 
preliminary hearing joint defendants, who were accused of arson 
and burglary. He then represented one of the defendants at a 
separate hearing in which he testified against the other 
defendant (Smith) in return for a reduced charge. The Court 
found that a conflict of interest was "clearly shown" in the 
attorney's attempted representation of both defendants. The 
Court quoted a California case, People v. Superior Court of San 
Luis Obispo, 156 Cal.Rptr 487, 488-9 (1979), in which the 
attorney faced a similar conflict presented by plea bargain 
offers to his clients: 
[A] conflict of interest arose from this offer which 
prevents the public defender from effectively 
representing the client to whom the offer was made ... 
The public defender cannot ethically advise the offeree 
to accept the offer or otherwise advise him in any 
manner which might encourage a decision to accept the 
offer when to do so would be directly adverse to the 
interest of his other client. Conversely, counsel 
necessarily acts against the interests of the offeree 
if he advises rejection of an offer which should be 
accepted. 
The Court found the decision of Smith's attorney to advise 
his co-defendant concerning the prosecution's offer had adversely 
affected Smith. "He was not effectively assisting this 
defendant; he was not identifying with his interests." Id. at 
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698 (citing Alires v. Turner, 449 P.2d 241 (Utah 1969); see also 
State v. McNicol, 554 P.2d 203 (Utah 1976)). 
The Court reversed Smith's conviction without requiring a 
showing of prejudice, declaring the following: 
The assistance of counsel is among those 
"constitutional rights so basic to a fair trial that 
their infraction can never be treated as harmless 
error," Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), see 
also Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, ... (1978). 
We believe there is error here, and need not inquire 
into whether the error was harmless, because of the 
fundamental nature of the constitutional rights 
involved. 
Id. at 699. 
In Armstrong v. People, 701 P.2d 17 (Colo. 1985), a husband 
and wife were represented in a joint trial by a single attorney. 
The Colorado Supreme Court found that an actual conflict of 
interest had been shown, stating the following: 
[T]he great bulk of the evidence introduced at trial 
was directed toward [the husband's] alleged 
culpability. Because he represented both defendants, 
defense counsel could not properly refer to the 
disparate charges of criminal conduct or comment about 
this state of the evidence to the jury. 
Id. at 22. 
The Court observed the effect of this disparity of evidence: 
[D]efense counsel at no time compared the amount and 
gravity of the evidence against [the husband] with the 
minimal and circumstantial nature of the evidence 
introduced to establish [the wife's] guilt. This 
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omission can be explained only by the observation that 
such argument would have emphasized the stronger case 
established against [the husband] . 
Id. at 23. 
In the present case, trial counsel represented two co-
defendants with considerably different arguments to be made 
at trial. Nearly all the evidence presented at trial was 
directed at the culpability of Appellant's co-defendant, for 
alleged possession of a controlled substance. Evidence 
concerning Appellant related primarily to her presence in 
the searched vehicle and her role in allegedly consenting to 
the search. An effective representation of Appellant under 
these circumstances would have required counsel to emphasize 
this disparity, focusing upon the alleged guilt of Mr. 
Martinez rather than her own. Mr. Gordon, trial counsel for 
Appellant and Mr. Martinez thus faced a conflict of interest 
between his two clients and could not effectively represent 
them both. By attempting to do so, he severely compromised 
his representation of Appellant individually, denying her 
the effective assistance of counsel guaranteed by the United 
States and Utah Constitutions. 
-22-
When Mr. Gordon appeared as counsel for both Appellant 
and Mr. Martinez, he did not indicate for the record whether 
he had discussed the conflict of interest issue with them. 
(Minute Entry p.4). However, initial investigation of their 
case would have immediately revealed the potential for such 
conflict in the disproportionate quantity of evidence 
against the respective co-defendants.4 Mr. Martinez also 
apparently communicated this disparity to Mr. Gordon from 
the beginning. (Sentencing Tr. at p. 11-12) 
As soon as this disparity in their positions became 
apparent, Mr. Gordon's duty of representation required him 
to move for appointment of separate attorneys, or at least 
to notify the Court of the potential conflict. See State v. 
4
 Nearly all the evidence produced at trial tended to implicate Mr. Martinez rather than 
Appellant, including his alleged confessions to Officers Riches and Watkins (Tr. at p.58-60, 98-
102). No evidence indicated that Appellant knew the marijuana was being transported, although 
Officer Riches testified that she admitted seeing Mr. Martinez load something into the van. (Tr. 
at p.58, 83-4). Appellant allegedly commented to Officer Jensen after his discovery of the 
marijuana that "she didn't know it was weed." (Tr. at p. 90, 94-5). Officers Riches and Jensen 
testified that Appellant "didn't have a problem" with the initial search of the vehicle, tending to 
support her claim of ignorance. (Tr. at p.82). 
Mr. Gordon could readily have discovered the expected testimony of the officers either by 
availing himself of the opportunity for a preliminary hearing, by conducting discovery, or by 
interviewing witnesses. 
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Webb, supra, 790 P.2d 65, 72 (1980); Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 
U.S. 335, 346-47 (1980). Such information clearly could have 
affected the trial judge's decision to allow Mr. Gordon to 
continue to represent both defendants.5 
Mr. Martinez stated at sentencing that he had wished 
all along to admit guilt in order to deflect responsibility 
from Appellant (Tr. of sentencing, p. 11) He reported that 
he had asked Mr. Gordon to plea bargain on one or more 
occasions at least two weeks before the trial (testimony 
partially indistinguishable, p.11), but that "it was against 
his [Mr. Gordon's] wishes to do so." Mr. Martinez added 
that "when he did, he had done it, he said it was already to 
late. He got a letter from (inaudible) and it was too late 
for that plea bargain." Mr. Martinez reiterated his 
frustration: 
And I had told him, and he goes, well, I think you 
can win this and I don't want you to do this. And 
I wanted to know--I told him to plea bargain — I'm 
the one that's (inaudible) on my wife, and she 
5
 In its order sanctioning Mr. Gordon for repeated non-appearances before, the Court noted 
that it had "discussed its concerns with defendant in open Court as [was] satisfied that defendants 
acted knowingly in retaining counsel." (Order, July 11,1998, p. 29). However, the record shows 
no discussion of the conflict of interest issue at that or any other time. 
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shouldn't be going to trial. He goes, I think you 
can beat this. And you know how things went after 
that. And I kept on telling him, no, I just want 
you to plea bargain. Even the day of the trial, I 
told him, well, can't you just stop this and I'll 
plead guilty right now, so we can get--so my wife 
won't get, you know, get--plead guilty on her, 
too, you know? An he goes no, we can't do that no 
more. 
(Sentencing Tr. at p. 11-12) 
As noted in State v. Smith, 691 P.2d 697, 698 (1980), 
where a plea bargain favoring one co-defendant may adversely 
affect another, a clear conflict of interest is presented. 
The fact that defendants did not inform the Court of a 
conflict of interest does not preclude them from raising the 
issue on appeal. It is the duty of the attorney to inform 
the Court concerning potential conflict of interest and to 
avoid compromising his duty of loyalty. State v. Webb, 
supra at 72; see Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 346-7 
(1980); U.S. v. Burney, 756 F.2d 787, 790-3 (10th Cir. 
1985); Holloway v, Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 (1978). Appellant 
cannot be punished for Mr. Gordon's failure to do so. 
In State v. Smith, 621 P.2d 697, 699 (1980), as in the 
present case, the defendant raised the issue of conflict of 
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interest for the first time on appeal. The Supreme Court 
held that this omission did not preclude its consideration 
of the issue, noting, "The attorneys responsible for raising 
an objection did not do so. And we cannot assume that under 
these circumstances the attorneys advised defendant of this 
conflict, nor that they advised him that he must object on 
his own behalf to avoid waiving his constitutional rights. 
•The law will not assume that counsel had advised his client 
of his inadequacies or those of his associates.' quoting 
Commonwealth v. Via, 316 A.2d 895 (1974). 
II. COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO MOVE FOR EXCLUSION OF 
ILLEGALLY OBTAINED EVIDENCE DEPRIVED APPELLANT OF HER 
RIGHT TO THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL. 
U.S. CONST., AMEND IV, and UTAH CONST., ART. I, §14, 
guarantee the right of individuals, "to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures.11 The Court have held that "although 
a person has a lesser expectation of privacy in a car than 
in his or her home, one does not lose the protection of the 
Fourth Amendment while in an automobile." State v. Lopezr 
873 P.2d 1127, 1131 (Utah 1994) (quoting State v. Schlosser, 
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774 P.2d 1132, 1135 (Utah 1989). 
The court has also stated that under the above-stated 
provision, a warrantless roadside search of an automobile 
will be upheld only if "it was premised upon probable cause 
and exigent circumstances." State v. Anderson, 910 P. 2d 
1229, 1236-7 (Utah 1996) . 
The test for whether a search or seizure is 
constitutionally reasonable is twofold: (1) was the police 
officer's action justified at its inception? (2) was the 
resulting detention reasonably related in scope to the 
circumstances that justified the interference in the first 
place? see State v. Shepard, 955 P.2d 352, 255 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1998) . 
As part of this inquiry, the courts have found that 
when an officer stops a vehicle, "the detention must be 
temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate 
the purpose of the stop." Id. Also, "once a driver has 
produced a valid driver's license and evidence of 
entitlement to use the vehicle, he must be allowed to 
proceed on his way, without being subjected to further delay 
-27-
by police for additional questioning." State v. Lopez, 873 
P.2d 1126, 1137 (Utah 1994) {quoting State v. Robinson, 797 
P.2d 431, 435 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); see also State v. James, 
977 P.2d 489, 491 (Utah Ct. App. 199?), State v. Chapman, 
921 P.2d 446, 452 (Utah 1995). 
Officer Riches' stated reason for stopping Mr. 
Martinez's vehicle consisted of "the unsafe lane change and 
activity that happened there." (Tr. at p. 50). Riches 
described the activity of the van as follows: 
There was a red van in the left lane also and it 
was passing the truck. It immediately sped up and 
went over into the right lane, cutting off the 
truck, and then--an then it turned on its right 
signal and then went up the exit ramp ... I 
noticed also that it had a license plate light 
out. It had come up to the stop sign there at 
Floy Wash, failed to stop, and then it turned 
right and then it turned on its signal light. 
(Tr. at p. 50, 69-70) 
Thus, Officer Riches' stated purpose for stopping Mr. 
Martinez's vehicle related only to traffic violations, and 
any further detention of defendants was required to be 
"reasonably related in scope" to this purpose. Riches first 
requested that Price Dispatch run a computer check on co-
-28-
defendant, the driver (Tr. at p. 51-2, 71-2), which showed 
that his license had expired. (Tr. at p. 53-4) Riches 
requested a similar check on Appellant "to see if her 
driver's license was valid so she could drive." (Tr. at p. 
51-2, 71) .6 
According to Riches, dispatch then advised him "that 
the male driver had weapons charges against him, also drug 
charges against him. Then they told me that the female 
passenger had drug charges against her." (Tr. at p. 52, 73, 
78) As shown by co-defendant's Presentence Investigation 
Report, Mr. Martinez was convicted of Possession of Cocaine, 
Use of a Firearm during a Drug Crime, and Aiding and 
Abetting in 1989, but had a clean record from then until the 
incident in question. (Presentence Investigation Report, 
p.4)7 
6
 Riches never testified specifically whether or not 
Appellant's license proved to be valid, however, she was 
later instructed to drive the van to Green River behind 
Riches patrol car. (Tr. at p. 56) 
7
 Riches testified that dispatch did not give him the 
dates of Mr. Martinez's reported charges. (Tr. at p. 72-3, 
81). However, he did not testify concerning any recent 
reports or investigations or any outstanding warrants. 
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Riches testified that upon learning about defendant's 
prior charges, "I was concerned for my safety because of the 
weapons." (Tr. at p. 52-54, 74) After requesting that Mr. 
Martinez stop out of the van, Riches asked him about both 
the weapons charges and the drug charges (Tr. at p. 53, 73-
74, 84) . Mr. Martinez told him that the charges "happened 
some time ago." (Tr. at p. 53, 74, 84-85). Mr. Martinez 
stated that there were no weapons on his person or in the 
vehicle, and denied possessing any drugs. (Tr. at p. 53) 
Riches then asked for permission to search the vehicle, 
which Mr. Martinez declined. (Tr. at p. 53, 78, 82, 87) 
At this point, Riches had completed all activity 
reasonably related to the stated purpose of his traffic 
stop. He had information relating to the legal driving 
status of both defendants and had accessed records dating as 
far back at 1989, yet had received no indication of any 
recent criminal activity. At this point, Riches had three 
options, as set forth in State v. Chapman, 921 P.2d 443, 446 
(Utah 1995): to place Mr. Martinez under arrest for driving 
violations, to issue him a citation, or to release him and 
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allow Appellant to drive. In order to further detain 
defendants, Riches had to demonstrate na reasonable 
suspicion of more serious criminal activity." State v. 
Shepard, 955 P.2d 352, 355 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) quoting 
State v, Robinson, 797 P.2d 431, 435 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
This suspicion would have had to be "based on specific, 
articulable facts drawn from the totality of the 
circumstances facing the officer at the time of the stop." 
Id. Riches testified to no facts indicating such criminal 
activity other than prior offenses in defendant's past. 
Riches testified that when he learned of the prior 
weapons charge against co-defendants, he wished to search 
the vehicle because of fear for his safety (Tr. at p. 52-4, 
74). However, Riches' concern was based only solely upon 
criminal charges against co-defendant which had occurred 
eight years earlier. (Tr. at p. 52-4, 74) Co-defendant's 
prior criminal record did not, in itself, justify a vehicle 
search. 
In State v. Humphrey, 937 P.2d 137 (Utah App. 1997), 
this Court considered whether an officer had properly 
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considered past criminal activity in establishing suspicion 
to justify an automobile stop. The Court stated, "the fact 
an individual previously has been involved in criminal 
activity is ... not enough, " and that it could be 
considered only in combination with other factors. Id. at 
143.8 
In State v. O'Brien, 959 P.2d 647, 648 (Utah 1998), the 
Court upheld an officer's right to pursue "a means of 
investigation that was likely to quickly confirm or dispel 
his suspicion that defendant may have hidden a gun in the 
vehicle." see Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1132 (citing State v. 
Grovier, 808 P.2d 133 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) quoting U.S. v. 
Sharpe, 470 U.S. 686, 785 (1985)). However, in that case, 
the officer had observed "furtive movements" on the part of 
the defendant. In addition, the defendant admitted he had a 
gun in his truck. The Court specified that the officer 
"took reasonable nonintrusive, precautionary actions to 
In the context of determining probable cause to search, prior criminal history is not properly 
considered at all. State v. Brooks, 849 P.2d 640, 644 (Utah App. 1993); State v. Vigh (prior 
criminal record and Narcotics Strike Force investigations "not properly part of that 
determination.) 
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ensure his own safety, " consisting simply of looking into 
the passenger window of defendant's truck. 
In State v. Chapman, 921 P.2d 446, 453 (Utah 1995), the 
officer conducting a vehicle stop had received information 
reported three weeks earlier that the suspect was known to 
carry a weapon. Even in that case, the Court stated, 
"unless Chapman gave immediate indication that there was a 
weapon in the vehicle, the ensuing search cannot be 
justified as a 'weapons search.'" As Judge Orme stated, 
"Nothing about the nature of the underlying offense being 
investigated prompted a concern for safety." Thus not even 
the known possession of a weapon as recently as three weeks 
earlier was considered sufficient reason to search. 
In the present case, Officer Riches reported no such 
"immediate indication that there was a weapon in the 
vehicle." He had obtained no information concerning recent 
criminal activity by co-defendant. (Tr. at p. 72-3, 81) He 
reported no "furtive movements" or other behavior which made 
him suspicious, nor any conduct of a threatening nature. 
Although Officer Riches testified that he was initially 
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concerned about his safety, (Tr. at p. 52-54, 74) he 
reported that after Mr. Martinez stepped out of the van, "At 
that time I felt that I was on level terms, he was out of 
the vehicle, I didn't see any weapons on him." (Tr. at p. 
53). Officer Jensen then arrived to provide additional 
assistance, and remained near Officer Riches' vehicle with 
co-defendant inside (Tr. at p. 53, 79, 82, 88-9). At this 
point, Riches' safety concerns had been mitigated and he had 
no reason to search for weapons. This set of facts did not 
even establish the reasonable suspicion required to conduct 
a full search. 
Defendant's consent to search was unlawfully obtained 
because it was requested after the legitimate purpose for 
the traffic stop had been completed and thus it was gained 
by exploiting an illegal police detention. In order to show 
that consent was lawfully obtained, the state must show that 
it was (1) voluntary and (2) not obtained by exploitation of 
a prior illegality. State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684, 688 
(Utah 1990) . In determining whether evidence was obtained 
by exploitation of a prior illegality, the courts looked at 
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whether consent was significantly affectuated from the 
illegal seizure. The factors to be considered in an 
exploitation analysis include temporal proximity of the 
illegality and the consent, the presence of intervening 
circumstances, and the purpose and flagrancy of the official 
misconduct. Id. at 690-1. 
In State v. Godina-Luna, 826 P.2d 652 (Utah Ct. App. 
1992), as in the present case, the driver was unable to 
produce a driver's license and was questioned concerning 
weapons and drugs. Believing that these facts, along with 
his Mexican ethnicity would lead the officer to search 
regardless of consent, the driver gave verbal consent to 
search. The Court found that "the consent occurred during 
an illegal seizure, thus no time factor separated the 
illegality from the consent." Id. see Wong Sun V. U.S., 
371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963); State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 
786 (Utah 1991). 
In the present case, consent was obtained at a time 
when the driving credentials of both defendants had been 
obtained. (Tr. at p. 51-2, 71-2) A check of their records 
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had disclosed no recent criminal activity or warrants (Tr. 
at p. 52, 72-3, 78, 81) and any initial safety concerns had 
been addressed by further questioning of Mr. Martinez (Tr. 
at p. 53, 84-5) and the presence of a back-up officer. (Tr. 
at p. 53, 79, 82, 88-9) Officer Riches himself stated that 
"I was on level terms ..." (Tr. at p. 53) Having completed 
the purpose of the stop, the officers should have simply 
issued co-defendant a citation and allowed the defendants to 
proceed on their way without further delay, either with or 
without a citation.9 see Chapman, supra. Rather than do 
so, Riches continued to question Mr. Martinez and improperly 
requested consent to search, first from Mr. Martinez (Tr. at 
p. 53, 78, 82, 87), and then from Appellant. (Tr. at p. 54, 
82) Following his initial search around the driver's and 
passenger!s seats, which disclosed no weapons, (Tr. at p. 
54, 77-79, 83, 88) Riches shined his flashlight around the 
back of the vehicle and found nothing (Tr. at p. 77) Riches 
9
 Although Mr. Martinez's license was suspended, Riches did not testify to any deficiency in 
Appellant's license, which he had also checked through dispatch (Tr. at p. 51-4, 73, 78). Riches 
testified that he later instructed Appellant to drive the van behind his own vehicle to Green River 
again without mentioning any deficiency in her driving status. LL 
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or Jensen then asked for permission to search more 
extensively. After Appellant declined permission for an 
additional search (Tr. at p. 54), Officer Jensen pressed her 
further, asking her to lift a blanket underneath the 
"captain's chair" in the back. (Tr. at p. 54, 88-9) 
Defendant complied. (Tre. at p. 54-5, 88-9) 
By this time, defendants had been detained well beyond 
the time reasonably necessary to effectuate the articulated 
purpose of the stop and had been questioned repeatedly 
concerning events occurring eight years earlier. The time 
of the stop was approximately 1:00 to 1:15 a.m. (Tr. at p. 
64) Appellant had been trying to sleep (Tr. at p. 51) and 
was attempting to keep her baby asleep. (Tr. at p. 54, 88) 
Appellant's consent to a more extensive search at this 
point, after first declining permission, cannot be 
characterized as voluntary. Moreover, Officer Jensen's 
request for consent was improper at this point when the 
purpose of the traffic stop had been completed and detention 
of defendants had ceased to be legitimate. 
Thus, her consent did not justify the otherwise illegal 
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search. Evidence resulting from the search was inadmissible 
and Mr. Gordon's failure to move to suppress constituted 
error. In State v. Gallegos, 957 P.2d 973 (Utah Ct. App. 
1998) this Court found that counsel's performance was 
ineffective where counsel failed to move to suppress 
evidence gained during an illegal search. 
In the present case, because defendant had been 
illegally detained far beyond the legitimate purposes of the 
stop, her alleged consent was not freely given and did not 
justify an otherwise illegal search. Yet Mr. Gordon made no 
motion to suppress at any time, an omission even more 
damaging to defendant than that demonstrated in the Gallegos 
case, supra. The substantial prejudice cause to defendant's 
case by admission of this illegal evidence deprived her of 
her right to the effective assistance of counsel and created 
reversible error. 
III. COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO DO DISCOVERY OR CONDUCT A 
PRELIMINARY HEARING DEPRIVED APPELLANT OF HER RIGHT TO 
THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL. 
Mr. Gordon's waiver of a preliminary hearing on behalf 
of Appellant deprived her of a "critical stage" in the 
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proceedings and denied her of her right to the effective 
assistance of counsel. In analyzing a claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel, the two-prong test of Strickland v. 
Washinton is applied as explained in State v. Brandley, 972 
P.2d 78, 84 (Utah 1997): 
Defendant must show, first, that his counsel 
rendered a performance which fell below an 
objective standard of reasonable professional 
judgment and, second, that counsel's deficient 
performance prejudiced the defendant, citing State 
v. Gordon, 913 P.2d 350, 355 (Utah 1996), 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 
(1984) . 
In determining whether counsel's performance was 
deficient, the courts recognize "a wide range of 
professionally competent assistance" and a presumption that 
"under the circumstances, the challenged action might be 
considered sound trial strategy." State v. Frame, 723 P.2d 
401, 405 (Utah 1986), State v. Classon, 935 P.2d 524, 533 
(Utah Ct. App. 1997), State v. Tempiinf 805 P.2d 182, 186 
(Utah 1990) . 
In the present case, Mr. Gordon's waiver of a 
preliminary hearing and his failure to remedy this 
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deficiency through discovery fell below any objective 
standard of reasonableness and cannot be viewed as "sound 
trial strategy." According to State v. Ortega, 751 P.2d 
1138, 1140 (Utah 1988), a preliminary hearing "provides the 
defendant with (1) the particulars on the nature of the 
State's case and (2) a means to discover and preserve 
evidence favorable to his defense" State v. Anderson,612 
P.2d 778, 784 (Utah 1980); Kearns-Tribune Corp. v. Lewis, 
685 P.2d 515, 520 (Utah 1984). The court continued, 
"although these ancillary purposes have been criticized in 
the past ... they have made up part of the fabric of our law 
for over three-quarters of a century." Id. 
By waiving this hearing, Mr. Gordon deprived defendants 
of a "critical stage" in the proceedings, forfeiting a 
chance to obtain "the particulars on the nature of the 
State's case" and "discover and preserve evidence" favorable 
to their defense as guaranteed by the Ortega case, supra, 
and its successors. This waiver constituted part of a 
continuing pattern of unpreparedness and not a matter of 
-40-
"legitimate trial strategy." 
After waiving the hearing, Mr. Gordon continued to show 
a pattern of unpreparedness by failing to conduct discovery. 
(Judgment Roll and Index, R00001-00002) 
The Utah Supreme Court stated as follows in State v. 
Tempiin, 805 P.2d 182, 187 (1990): 
If counsel does not adequately investigate the 
underlying facts of a case, including the 
availability of prospective defense witnesses, 
counsel's performance cannot fall within the "wide 
range of reasonable professional assistance." 
This is because a decision not to investigate 
cannot be considered a tactical decision. It is 
only after an adequate inquiry has been made that 
counsel can make a reasonable decision to call or 
not to call particular witnesses for tactical 
reasons. citing People v. Cole, 776 P.2d 551, 
554-555 (Colo. 1989), State v, Crestani, 771 P.2d 
1085, 1091 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). See Taylor v. 
Warden, 905 P.2d 277, 283 (Utah 1995), State v. 
Tyler, 850 P.2d 1250, 1255 (Utah 1993); 
Strickland, supra at 686. 
Because counsel for defendant Templin had failed to 
investigate a list of potential witnesses given to him by 
defendant, the court held that his performance had fallen 
10
 In his August 24, 1998, Order, which followed the waiver of the hearing, the court 
indicated that Mr. Gordon had "appeared before the court on four occasions and [had] not 
appeared on time prepared to proceed even once." (R. 00029)(See Section IV A below). 
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below the standard of professional reasonableness set forth 
in Strickland and that this deficient performance had caused 
prejudice to defendant. 
In the present case, the record shows that Mr. Gordon 
forfeited two critical opportunities to gather information 
concerning the State's case. First at the scheduled 
preliminary hearing and again through the discovery process. 
Had Mr. Gordon attempted to investigate by requesting 
prosecution documents, a list of potential witnesses, or 
other information, he could have obtained some of the 
information lost through his waiver of the hearing. 
Thus, as in the Templin case, Mr. Gordon's failure to 
investigate, particularly following his waiver of the 
preliminary hearing, cannot be considered a tactical 
decision. 
Mr. Gordon's waiver of two critical opportunities to 
inform himself concerning the State's case, as described 
above, irreparably hindered his trial preparation, resulting 
in an inadequate defense of Appellant's case. Thus, not 
only did his performance fall below a standard of reasonable 
-42-
professional judgment, as required by the Strickland test, 
but it also met the second step of that test by causing 
actual prejudice to Appellant. 
In order to demonstrate prejudice resulting from 
deficient performance by counsel, defendant mush show that 
"there is reasonable probability that, but for counsel's 
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would 
have been different. A reasonable probability is probably 
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693; State v. Classon, 935 P.2d 524, 
533 (Utah Ct. App. 1997); State v. Frame, 723 P.2d 401, 405 
(Utah 1986). 
In the present case, two principle strategies for 
Appellant's defense include (1) to focus upon co-defendant's 
responsibility for the alleged activities and (2) to attempt 
to suppress evidence obtained through an illegal search. 
Mr. Gordon's failure to adequately investigate the state's 
case deprived him of information critical to both of these 
strategies. 
For example, Mr. Gordon missed the opportunity prior to 
.43-
trial to hear Officer Riches articulate his reasons for 
searching defendant's vehicle. (Tr. at p. 51-4, 7204, 78, 
81). Had Mr. Gordon obtained such information prior to 
trial, a reasonable probability exists that he would have 
realized the illegality of the search, obtained follow-up 
information if necessary, and moved to suppress evidence 
obtained as a result. (See Section II above) An 
examination of this issue by trial Court would have 
significantly affected the outcome of Appellant's case. 
In addition, Mr. Gordon missed the chance, prior to 
trial, to hear the weight of the testimony against co-
defendant and the contents of his alleged confession (See 
note 5, supra, p 18). Conversely, Mr. Gordon missed the 
chance to hear the relative absence of testimony against 
Appellant herself (Id.)suggesting an emphasis on co-
defendant ' s probable guilt as a defense to her own case. A 
reasonable probability exists that such information would 
have prompted him to address the resulting conflict of 
interest with the court, either through a motion to withdraw 
-44-
or other appropriate action.11 A reasonable probability 
also exists that Mr. Gordon might have pursued a plea 
bargain in behalf of one or both clients, as requested by 
Mr. Martinez (Sentencing Tr. at p. 11-12, Section I (A), 
supra, p. 18-20). Instead, Mr. Gordon damaged Appellant's 
case by presenting a somewhat fragmented defense resulting 
from the impossibility of simultaneously arguing their 
conflicting defenses. (Tr. at p.121-6, 130, 150-4). 
As another example of prejudice to defendant's case, 
Mr. Gordon demonstrated his unfamiliarity with prosecution 
witnesses at trial by failing to move for the exclusion of a 
prosecution witness, Sgt. Jensen, prior to the testimony of 
another witness, Officer Riches. (Tr. at p. 48-57) 
Thirteen minutes after Riches had begun to testify (Minute 
entry p.6), Mr. Gordon belatedly moved to exclude Sgt. 
Jensen, who was present in the courtroom at that time. (Tr. 
at p. 57) Sgt. Jensen had assisted Riches in the search and 
questioning and testified thereafter concerning the same 
11
 Waiver of the preliminary hearing also damaged defendant by depriving the trial judge 
himself of information which might have alerted him to the conflict in the absence of a motion 
from defense counsel. 
-45-
events. (Tr. at p. 86-95) At the point where Jensen was 
excluded from the courtroom, Riches had already described 
the particulars of the search, including his motivations, 
statements by defendants and the discovery of contraband 
(Tr. at p. 87-9). Mr. Gordon, in his delayed motion to 
exclude, explained, "I didn't realize that officers were 
still in the courtroom." (Tr. at p.57) 
Thus, by forfeiting opportunities for a preliminary 
hearing and discovery in Appellant's case, Mr. Gordon missed 
information concerning potential favorable witnesses and 
evidence which would have directly affected its outcome. 
This erroneous conduct satisfied both prongs of the 
Strickland test by first, falling below a standard of 
reasonable professional judgment and, second, causing actual 
prejudice. Accordingly, even in the absence of a 
presumption of prejudice due to an actual conflict of 
interest, as shown in Section I above, Mr. Gordon's conduct 
would require reversal on the basis of ineffective 
assistance of counsel. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, Appellant respectfully 
requests that this court reverse the trial court's 
conviction and remand the matter for a new trial. 
DATED THIS 26th day of January, 2000. 
Happy J. Morgan 
Attorney for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this the 2 6th day of January, 
2 000, I caused to be served two true and correct copies of 
the foregoing Appellant's Brief by first-class postage pre-
paid mail to the following: 
Assistant Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-08,5^' 
Ha^y-J-P Morgan 
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01 /27 /2000 05:33 FAX 12102 
SEVENTH OIST85CT COUff 
Srand Couf: ,-
rLEO APR J 7 iSCc) 
£>.«KK Of Th* COuRT 
ev« Deputy 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR GRAND COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
EEBRA JEAN MARTINEZ, 
Defendant . 
No. 9717^270 
JUDGMENT AND ORDSP 
OF PROBATION 
APRIL 7 19 95 
KOITCHA8LE LYLE R. ANDERSON 
Plaintiff" Attorn-?*/; William L, Benge 
Defendant Attorney: Happy Morgan 
DEFENDANT, DEBRA JEAN MARTINEZ, having heretofore 
entered a plea of guilty to the offense of: 
POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE, a Third Degree Felony, 
and no legal reason having besn shown why judgment of this Court 
should not be pronounced, it is the judgment of this Court as 
follows: 
That the defendant serve a term in chs UTAH STATE 
PRISON of NOT MCR2 THAN FIVE (5) YEARS. 
Tef*ndaut is further ORDERED to pay a fine and 
assessment in ths total amount of $325.00. 
1 
01/27/2000 05:33 FAX ©03 
The Court will stay the prison sentence and place the 
defendant on probation if defendant complies with the following 
conditions .-
1. That defendant satisfactorily complete a thirty 
six (35) month probation period under the supervision of the 
Department, of Adult Probation and Parole, sign the agreement with 
the Department, and abide by its terms and conditions. 
2. 7hat defendant, serve six (6J months in the Grand 
Jail wich credit for Lime served and immediate release. 
3. That defendant pay the fine in full, 
4. That defendant enter into and satisfactorily 
cotr.plete either an inpatient or outpatient treatment program as 
determined by Adult Probation and Parole. 
5. That dexencar.L obtain/maintain full time 
verifiable employment as soon as permitted by her therapist. 
The Court retains jurisdiction to make other and 
further orders as it may deem necessary from time to time^ , 
DAT3D this 2j}± day of April, 19S3. 
BY THE COURT: 
0 
William ^ Ev Benge 
Grand County Attorney 
2 
0 1 / 2 7 / 2 0 0 0 05:33 FAX ®04 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that en the "2^" d aY c f April, 1999, I 
band delivered or mailed, postage prepaid, a true and correct 
copy of the above Judgment and Order of Probation to Happy 
Morgan, Attorney for Defendant, s South 100 East, Moab, Utah 
84532; Adult Probation and Parole, 1165 South Highway 151, Moab, 
Utah 8453 2. 
I N ^ » 
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PRIVATE 
STATE OF UTAH 
ADULT PROBATION AM) FAROLE 
RfXJION III OFFICE 
451 South 200 East 
Salt Lake CUy,Uc*b W i n 
Telephone: 239-2X03 
PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION REPORT 
Date Due; 11/23/98 
Sentencing Date: 11/27/98 
•TTmng,t LYLE R, Afflfflffigo*- SEVENTH m?TRrrr COURT 
jk*a&& 
SCO] 
_ GBA£D_, UTAH 
(CITY) (COUNTY) 
tRY. INVESTIGATOR 
NAME: Archie Joseph Martinez 
ALIASES: Joseph Archie Martir.cz. 
Gilbert Avila 
ADDRESS^ 3115 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, UT84II5 
BIRTHPLACE J Los Angeles, CA 
FIJEA: Convicted DATEJ 10/09/98 
LEGAL RESIDENCE; Utah 
MAJUTAL STATUS; Married 
COURT CASE >rO: 97-1700271 
OB5CIS NO: 00131819 
CO-DEEENDANTS: Drbra Je&n Martinez 
BIRTHDATEJ2/0«/53AGE:44 
OFFENSE: Possession of* Cnnrmlled 
Substance, Third Degree Felony 
PROS. ATTORNEYrBenge 
DEF. ATTORNEY: Victor Gordon 
01^26/2000 03:11 F\X r^ 
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PAGE 2 
PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION REPORT 
JOSEPH MARTINEZ 
PLgABARCrAiy. 
The defimdanr was found guilty of Third Degree Felony Possession of a Controlled Sutaiancc during a 
thai on 10/09/98, 
SOURCE OF INFORMATION 
The County Attorney Files 
omciAfc YERSior* or Ofnv$fr 
On 11/25/97 at about 1:10 am the arresting officer was following a vehicle he was mending to stop fur 
speeding, when he noticed the van the defendant and rortefendam were in make an unsafe lane change in 
an offcamp from 1-70. The reporting officer stopped the van on a frontage road for various violation* and. 
as the defendant bad a previous weapons charge, asked permission from U»e defendant to search the van 
The defendant did not consent to a search, stating he did cot want to wake his daughter who was asleep in 
the van. The reporting oScer then asked the codefendanfs permission to search the vehicle, and she 
grilled it. According to the report, the officer saw a rectangle shaped object in the b*r.V nf the van that 
was covered with a^d and white blanket The codefendant was asked to uncover the object ajid the 
officer then saw black plastic tape and a small comer which appeared to be a giecn substance The 
codefendent was then asked m nncnver the entire object, A bale of marijuana was confiscate and put into 
evidence. It was later determined to weigh approximately 50 pounds, 
SOLTtCE OF INFORMATION 
Utah Highway Patrol Report. Case U 0997-01403 
PEFgNDA^rS VMHSIOrf QFOrrg^SE: 
The defendant's written statement on the offense is veroatim: 
'*A friend asked me to pick up a package for him in Colo. I did because i needed mone> to pay a few hi! is 
1 was shore on. I was coming back from Colo, and got pulled ever by ;hc UKP and ihwy fuund vhc weed in 
my van, my wife did not know about what I bac but because they didn't believe me they convicted her to. 
and they convicted her on my lies" 
01/26/2000 03:11 FAX „. 
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I'KhSeNTENCE INVESTIGATION REPORT 
JOSEPH MARTINEZ 
PLEA BARGAIN: 
The defendarr wa« found guilty of Third Degree Felony Possession of a Controlled Subsuwce during a 
trial on JO/09/98. 
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: 
The County Attorney Filfrs 
WHCIAL VERSION QLQFFEWE: 
On. 11/25/97 at about 1:10 air the arresting officer was follcwiag a vehicle h$ was intending to slop fo* 
speeding, when ha nouctd «h» van the defendant and cortftfendant were in mske an unsafe lane chan&c lo 
an offrainp &om 1-70, The reporting officer stopped the van on i frontage ro&d for various violations, and, 
as the defendant had z previous weapons charge, asked permission from tl*e defendant to-search the van. 
The defendant did nor. consent to a search, stating ho did oo: want to wake his daughter who was asleep in 
the van. The reporting officer then asked the codexfeodanf s permission to search the vehicle, and she 
grained it According to die wpoxx, the officer » w 4 rectangle shaped object in the bade nf the van dual 
was covered with a red and white blanket Th« codefendanx was asked to uncover the object, and the 
office then saw black plwric tape and a small somer which appeared to be a green subssuicc. TU 
coceiendan: was then a s i ^ ro uncnver ihe entiie object. A baje of marijuana was coniiscaied and put into 
evidence. It was later determined to weigh approximately 50 pounds.. 
SOURCEQF ICTQfc\f ATION: 
Utah Highway Patrol Repcit, Case M 0997-01403 
The defendant's written statement oa the offense is verbatim: 
"A friend asked me to p:ck up a package for him in Cola1 did because t needed mone> 10 pay a few h Ms 
1 was short on. I was coining back from Colo, and got pulled over by u*>e UK? and u-«y fyimd 1W0 weed in 
my van, my wife did DO; know about what I had but because they didn't believe me ihey convicted her 10, 
and they convicted her en my lies" 
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PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION REPORT 
JOSEPH MARTINEZ 
DEFENDANT'S VERSION OF QFfENSE: (continued) 
The dcfcnUaut stated chat he was going to gat $500 for transporting fhe narijiana, and thai alter lie *<!>• 
arrested he tried to cooperate with the DEA, but this did not work out, and he was charged. The defender, 
stated "I'm a grown man, I knew what I was getting into." 
3PT1RCK OF rWQPJ*LVnfflH: 
The Defendant 
CO-DEgE^ANT STATUS 
The defendant's wife is the codefendant in tlxis i!uiitei> and •'vas convicted of the same offense. She is 
scheduled for sentencing before Your Honcr on the same dale. 
SOtTRCF pF INTORMATIO?* 
Court Dockets and Utah Highway Pacroi Report, Case * 0997-05403 
VICTIM W A S T gTATBMETff: 
There is no victim in this case, 
REfiTTTUTtOV: 
Not applicable. 
CUSTQDYSTATO: 
The defendant was booked into the Grand County Jail on ! 1-26-97 and released after posting bail on II-
27-97, according to jail records; however, the defendant ciai;ju> iw ]«ive been incarcerated "one week" 
prior to his release. 
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: 
Contact with the Grand County Jail Offivials, the Defendant. 
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PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION REPORT 
JOSEPH MARTINEZ 
JUVENILE RECORD: 
The defarwiwt denies having a juvenile record. A review of records shows this appears to be the case. 
sorrarg. nv iNirnPMATTniv 
Utah Juvenile Court Reuvds and the Defendant 
A T O T R E C Q K P : 
DATE AGENCY OFFENSE PISPQSITWN 
10/01/74 
09/05/82 
01/17/89 
Albuquerque Polic* Driving while Intoxicated, TVWl School. Fine. Jail 
NM Leaving the Scene of an 
Accident, Careless Driving 
Salt Lake Police 
UT 
Salt Lake City 
Police/DEA 
UT 
Possession of a Sawed Off Fined 
Shotgun, Discharging 
Firearm 
Possession of Cocaine, Use Remanded to US Marshals, Prison, 
of a Firearm during a Drag Parole, No Association!, Fine 
Crime, AiUiug and Abetting 
SQURCE QF PfFORMATTQN: 
Utah Criminal History record (SID #0219055), FBI rap sheet (FBJ #53"967'<9). Coua Dockets, and the 
defendant 
PfirVTNG HISTORY: 
The defendant has no traffic violations. 
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: 
Drivers License Division records 
01/26/2000 03:11 FAX 
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PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION REPORT 
JOSEPH MARTINEZ 
H f r W g CASES: 
The defendant denies Laving further pending charges, and a review of Court Dockets shows this appears 
to be the case, 
SOURCE QffNTQRMATTQ^: 
Court Dockets and the Defendant 
FEQUATONff AMLE JggTQjiY: 
The defendant reported he was on four (4) years cf Federal Supervision after being released from federal 
prison* He has not bees supervised by the Steta of Utah on probation or parole. 
SQVKCtt Qt JMEOBMAHQg: 
Utah Department of Corrections records and the Defendant. 
£A£&G&Q1ZNP ANO PRESET LIVTNg SITUATION 
Thr defendant was bom in Los Angeles, CA, and has lived in Aihuquerqtie, MM, Pueblo, CO, Colorado 
Springs, CO, and Salt Lake City, Utah. He is one of twelve siblings, and his father was a migrant worker, 
The defendant sumol lib (kuily worked all of thai liv« to help their Father. His p»renU wwu rrarrwd to 
each other from 1549 until their deaths in 1989, The defendant stated he left bis parents' home a; age 
sixteen (16) to go into the Job Corps, He reports he got along well with his tamiJy growing up, and this 
ca jitisues today, 
The defendant's sister reports Oat there was conflict between d^ e defendant and bin father <*v« to physical 
aggressiveness in the family, primarily the defendant's mother and sisters being abased by his father The 
defendant's sister stated that the defendant took his father's death quite hard, as he had never been abie to 
rc3olve the conflict between cheat 
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: 
The Defendant and his sister. Margaret Ortega. 
01/28/2000 03:11 FAX 
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PK£3ENTLNCE INVESTIGATION REPORT 
JOSEPH MARTINEZ 
MAEIIAIJPSTORY: 
The defendant has beea married to his wife since ) 975. They have two (2) children, Lucy, age 2!. and 
Miracle, age 5. He reports his marriage is good, with some problems, but bener tnan most. 
The defrod&it's sister reports there is marital difficulty between bins and his wife ever since choir first 
incarceration- Siuce then he and his wife have been fighting mure, Uit they are jiaying together hecju-^ 
nf their youngest child She stated Che defendant blames himself for the trcublc'his wife is in as a result of 
this case. 
$M£Oi2ll^TQRMATma: 
The Defendant *nci his sister, Margaret Ortega* 
The defendant' reports he obtained his GJED. in Colorado, and he, along wtfc the rest of bis siblings, had 
to work to support their &cdly. 
The Defendant 
The defendant slates he was a member of fartuna Trace (i2) In Los Angeles txiwecu 1973 md ) 380, Uis 
arms bear taw*»« which confirm this; however, the defencant denied any current gang activity. He stated 
gang Ufe when he was active was much differen; :han now, and he does not condone cunwt g.ang acuon*. 
£QL[RaLQ£l>TQHMAIiQa: 
The Defendant and the Salt Lake Arefl flung Project records 
The defendant states be suffers from high blood pressure, but Is not under a doctor's care. 
01/28/2000 03;11 FAX 
11/24/88 IUE li;20 FAI 301 239 2110 RECIOff III INTAKE 
~ * M0AB A?*P 
@09 
@aoa 
PAGE 7 
PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION REPORT 
JOSEPH MARTINEZ 
SQVRCE OF INFQRMATIQN: 
The Defendant 
Mgrn^ALTSgALTH: 
The defendant described his menial health as "all right* He Ludkatcd *bat he is willing io *eek drug 
treatment, but be is not cwently in toy type of counseling or therapy. 
SOURCE Of INFORMATION 
The Defendant 
ALCOHOL HISTORY 
The defendant denies ever using alcohol 
i'hc Defendant 
BftUG HISTORY. 
The defendant states his drag of choice is marijuana, and acknowledged he will use it on a dajiy basis. He 
started smoking at age fifteen, and will smoke a maximum of Yi once a day. The defei.dajii wan on u* 
mate that he feels that Marijuana ought to be legalized At the same time he Indicated he realises He docs 
have an abuse problem, and is willing to seek treatment. 
SOURCE OF ffffpRMATIQW: 
The Defendant 
F^ffLQTME^UB^TORY: 
The defendant's Social Security Number is 547-23-S2S5 
The Defendant reports that he has always been self employed as an auto body mechanic The deltrubfrt 
reports he works an average of 20 to 40 hours per week. 
01/26/2000 05:11 FAX 
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PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION REPORT 
JOSEPH MARTINEZ 
3QURCE OF INFORMATION 
The Defendant. 
The defendant repora that hU monthly gross income is approximately S4O0-S60O. I !e rcpona the family 
total monthly bills arc S10C0 per month. They have had a vehicle repessessed. His wife Ls also employed 
on a full-time basis. 
The Defendant 
miTARY BECOME 
The defendant baa never been a member of the United States Aimed Forces 
SOURCE QF frTOTMATTOfc 
The Defendant 
Margaret Onega, the defendant's sister natsd that she fell the current situation happwed because he *hei 
a lot of problems* and turned to using drags as a means of coping, Ms Orce^ a named ihe defendants 
problems as being marital and financial, When asked fgr sentencing recommendations, she stated she fell 
that her brother should be gt*ci! "one more chance" bui nothing further, Ms Onega *uu-d shr has been 
'Calking -vith her brother about his actions, and he seems to be listening io her more ncm ih*ui he has ;n rhc 
past. 
01/26/2000 03:11 FAX Si 
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PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION Rf?OKT 
JOSEPH MARTINEZ 
EVAT.UAm-ESmMAftY: 
Now appearing before the Court for sentencing on the offense of Possession of a Ccnirullcd Subsianw 
with Intern to Distribute, * Third Degree Felony is Joseph Maninex. a 44 year old male. He does not have 
a juvenile record, hut has been convicted as an adult and served Federal lime Ibr, a previous charge «r :i 
similar tLMure. 
The defendant is married with twc children, one currently ar home. His wife is the co-defendant in this 
case, bat both state she was unaware of the drugs ia the vehicle. The defendant does admit his 
involvement in this offense, claiming he was transporting to* marijuana from Colorado for a ftknd. as he 
(the defendant) needed the money. It is net surprising the defendant needed money, as although he 
reports he is self-employed, his income Is limited and he has not evidenced much bUbUiiy in the 
employment area. He is also experiencing problems with his marriage, relaxed to the current case, and 
ether problems. It is also a concern he would have his 5 (five) year oid daughter with him while 
transporting a large quantise of drugs, thereby placing her a; risk. His only strength is his support iY^ iv 
his sister. As such he is not a good candidate for probation. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, 
SCOTT M CURRY, INVESTIGATOR 
APPROVED, 
VISOR 
01/26 /2000 03:11 FAX n>
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U'24 /W TUB 11:22 FAI 801 238 2110 REQIW m
 IMTjJDE , ^ X0AB ^ J f o 
ar.E w v pyrnMMFxnATinN 
It is the recommendation of the Utah Deparimcut c»f Corrections Adult Probation &. Parole, Court 
Services Unit the defendant be denied the privilege of Probaiion and be commiued io the Utah .State 
Prison forthwith for the term prescribed by law for tbe offense for which he was found guilty. Me should 
abo be ordered a fine of $1,000 plus an 85% surcharge. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED. 
SCOTT M CURRY, INVESTIGATOR 
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